--Civilians maintained clear numerical edges only in positions with the most spe cialized functions (Ministers of State and Directors-General), but in both such instances work under mainly military supervisors.
--There is no practical evidence suggesting an effort to "recivilianize" even grad ually those slots now held by military karyawan in the higher central bureaucracy.
Structuring Military Domination
Military karyawan, in concert with supportive civilian karyawan colleagues, dominate the affairs of every Cabinet Department.
--The most crucial Departments for ensuring regime maintenance, Defense and Security and Home Affairs, are under the most solid military control (100 percent and 89 percent of their leading positions, respectively).
--Over the duration of the New Order, the armed forces have never held less than 90 percent of the leading positions in the Department of Defense and Security.
--Internal armed forces personnel and organizational changes in 1965-66, 1969-70, 1974-75, and 1978-81 increasingly concentrated power centrally in the Army, the Defense Ministry in Jakarta, and the person of the Defense Minister himself.
--Military penetration of the Department of Home Affairs has risen more steadily and markedly over the course of the New Order than in any other Department (from 29 percent of the leading positions in 1966, to 71 percent in 1971, and 89 percent currently).
--Greater military penetration of particular Departments (Information, Social Affairs, Religion, Foreign Affairs, and Justice) has proceeded alongside the in crease in military incumbency for specific categories of office. In two other De partments (Communications, Manpower and Transmigration) military penetration continued at high levels throughout the New Order.
--There is no Department in which the military is not suitably placed, through filling the Secretary-General or Inspector-General slots or more usually both, to control and remain apprised of the full range of Departmental activities. Direct Presidential involvement in Departmental affairs serves to maintain these capa bilities .
--The topmost civilian technocrats and career civil servants, whose tenure de pends on their maintaining the trust of military patrons, are at least as active public proponents of government policies as the military karyawan.
--Save only in two cases, all civilians of Ministerial rank have one or more ex plicit military credentials or linkages which enhance their attractiveness to, or ability to work with, their military colleagues.
Military Karyawan Role Enhancement
Once disparaged by senior officers, karyawan assignments now carry increased rank and prestige.
--Disparagement of karyawan assignments by military officers has decreased as the perceived importance of controlling the central bureaucracy and its actual penetration by the military has increased.
--Wide public visibility and the impeccable military credentials of many serving military karyawan have also worked to elevate the prestige accorded the role by older and younger officers alike.
--The attractiveness and power of the military karyawan role has been yet fur ther enhanced because the Army, the most prestigious service, occupies the great bulk (81 percent) of military karyawan positions.
--Finally, the military karyawan has grown in officer esteem because the military ranks of those holding these positions have sharply escalated (from mainly Lieu tenant-Colonels or Colonels to Major-Generals in the case of the Army) over the course of the New Order.
Generational Power Monopoly
The 1945 Generation, those who successfully waged armed struggle in the Indo nesian Revolution, retains a near monopoly of military karyawan slots in the higher central bureaucracy and intends to hold this power base for at least the next five years.
--This solid control by the 1945 Generation persists despite the fact that all those military karyawan born by 1925 (61 percent of the total) have now been retired from active duty status.
--The Ministry of Defense and Security maintains effective control of retired military karyawan by holding military rank promotion exercises for them and mandating their membership in a military retirees association, through which loyalty to the armed forces is reinforced. Retired military karyawan also remain embedded in long-term webs of patron-client and close friendship networks, mainly composed of fellow officers.
--The determination of President Suharto and the readiness of the 1945 Genera tion to continue in karyawan roles make chances of a voluntary generational suc cession within military karyawan ranks remote over the next five years.
--There is not yet a single graduate of the new military academy at Magelang filling a karyawan position in the higher central bureaucracy.
The Successor Generation Crisis
The 1945 Generation faction loyal to President Suharto evidently intends to re tain its dominance in the higher central bureaucracy to preside over a smooth trans fer of leadership to Young Generation officers in the Army staff and command struc ture. This formula for generational succession is unlikely to succeed.
--The 1945 Generation Army leadership (from all current factions) has given assurances to the Young Generation Army officers that an intra-Army intergenerational power transfer will be substantially accomplished in 1983. Defense and Security Minister General Yusuf has on many public occasions promised Young Generation officers this change of generations within the Army will occur.
--T he formula for regime maintenance thus seems to be that for some indetermi nate period of time there will be a sharp and unprecedented cleavage between two major military power centers, the 1945 Generation military karyawan control ling politics and the Young Generation officers in the staff and command struc ture controlling the guns.
--It is far from clear that the Young Generation Army officers will accede to their subordinate political role in this emerging new-model New Order.
--No justification exists in Army doctrine for such generational stratification in the carrying out of the political aspects of the armed forces' dual civil and mili tary function.
--It is likely that Young Generation Army officers will therefore increasingly probe privately and publicly the operational meaning of the armed forces' dual function in a changing Indonesia.
--Several important retired 1945 Generation factions already critical of the Suhar to faction's implementation of the dual function include widely respected officers who have influenced the Young Generation intellectually during their professional military education.
--Successful generational successions in political leadership in Malaysia and Singapore are also likely to heighten Young Generation Army officers' concerns that the means for a comparable transition in Indonesia has not yet been fully worked out.
Introduction
In this article I will assess the scope, patterns, and implications for regime maintenance of penetration of Indonesia's higher central bureaucracy by the coun try's dominant military faction. That bureaucracy is defined here as the incumbent Third Development Cabinet (Kabinet Pembangunan III) and the topmost echelon of officials in its component Departments.1 Any civilian or military officeholder in the higher bureaucracy is referred to as a karyawan, essentially an honorific equiva lent of "functionary."2 This particular group of military karyawan, active duty and retired officers in top civilian bureaucratic assignments, comprise an increasingly visible, influential, and strategic segment of the broader military elite, particularly in the context of the vital regime maintenance issue of generational succession within ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Republic of Indonesia Armed F o rce s ).3 Other major military elite segments, such as other karyawan long active in the public and private sectors of the economy or active-duty flag-and field-grade officers within 1. Appendix A contains a full list of offices and their civilian and military incum bents in the Indonesian higher central bureaucracy. Positions in what are officially labeled Higher State Institutions (Lembaga Tertinggi/Tinggi Negara) and NonDepartmental Government Boards (Lembaga Pemerintah Non Departmen), vary greatly in potential influence and fall outside the focus of this article. However, such positions ought to be included in a more complete study of military karyawan.
A list of civilian and military incumbents in leading roles in these additional bodies appears for reference purposes in Appendix B. About half these incumbents, as in the higher central bureaucracy, are military karyawan.
2. The elastic coined term karyawan, as used in the broadest sense by the military, embraces any "worker" in a civilian (s ip il) position, governmental or nongovernmen tal. However, karyawan most often denotes higher-status government officials, whether civilian or military.
3. Includes the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police. Some recent sentiment for separating the Police from ABRI and restoring their civilian role (lost since 1961) has been voiced by parliamentarians of both opposition parties. However, the Police internal security role is thoroughly integrated with that of the Army and govern ment intelligence agencies. Reaction from pro-government parliamentarians and from the National Police Chief was therefore predictably negative. Still, the Police, despite better overall educational qualifications at senior officer levels than the other services, hold relatively few karya positions. See Kompas, September 8, 24, and 25 and October 2, 1981 , and Angkatan B ersenjata, September 16, 1981 . the general and separate services' staff and command structures, are treated here only when they overlap with the karyawan in the higher central bureaucracy.
Full-dress studies of the Indonesian military are remarkably few, usually his torical, sometimes overly general, and occasionally ideologically laden.4 Opportuni ties for sustained, direct, scholarly access to Indonesia's military establishment are controlled and pose real limits in outsiders' ability to answer some basic questions. Particularly relevant here is the unavailability of any official Indonesian roster of military karyawan.
However, it is also the case that a very large amount and considerable variety of pertinent public source materials have simply not been fully exploited or even examined.5 Findings reported here, derived from both these primary data and re liable secondary sources, are current as of mid-December 1981. The new (p ost-1972) spelling system is used throughout for all Indonesian words, including personal names.6
The H igher C entral Bureaucracy Coordinating Ministers by one or another name10 have been present in Indone sian Cabinets since 1959. During President Sukarno's Guided Democracy and Presi dent Suharto's early New Order, such persons were both more numerous and more powerful than in the current Third Development Cabinet. As the total number of portfolios in Cabinets declined, so did first the number and then the power of Coor dinating Ministers. Generally, increased power for Department Ministers has meant decreased power for Coordinating Ministers. Today's three Coordinating Ministers do not appear in the press as frequently as the Department Ministers they oversee.
Political and Security Affairs Coordinating Minister Panggabean and Economic, Financial, and Industrial Affairs Coordinating Minister Wijoyo are able to exert in fluence when necessary,due to their having the confidence and ear of the President. People's Welfare Coordinating Minister Surono enjoys neither, and has accordingly played in public the figurehead role designed for him. Panggabean covers the im portant "security" Departments, Wijoyo all the "development" ones (plus Communi cations), and Surono the lesser "social" domains.11
Among the Departments, Hankam (Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, Depart ment of Defense and Security) differs in two major respects from all others. First, it is literally wholly controlled by the military. Second, it has neither a SecretaryGeneral nor any Directors-General.
Military control of Hankam has its roots in the so-called 17 October 1952 Affair, a failed coup d'etat led by General Nasution and his military modernizers but con founded by Sukarno's resistance. Subsequently, civilian politicians were able to replace with ease key figures in a sharply divided Army. By 1955, both "pro 17 October" and "anti 17 October" military had become convinced such "civilian inter- , an annual quasi-official roster distributed by Yayasan Kesejahteraan Jayakarta Kodam V Jaya (Jayakarta Welfare Foundation of Military Area Command V, Greater Jakarta). Nine national daily newspapers were then used to verify this list and ascertain changes in incumbents. This yielded a list of 145 incumbents, 144 known to be current and one the last known. Each name on this list was then checked for military or civilian status by using an alphabetic file of public military biographies put together mainly from the sources cited in Appendix C . The final list complete with current military ranks of incumbents is given in Appendix A.
E xtent o f M ilita ry Penetration
• the President (a retired four-star General),
• seven of his eight principal aides (8 8 percent) in the State Secretariat,13 1 4
• two of the three Coordinating Ministers (Political and Security Affairs, People' s Welfare, both retired four-star Generals),
• eight of seventeen Department Ministers (47 percent),
• two of six Junior Ministers (33 percent),
• sixteen of eighteen Secretary-General level slots (89 percent),
• eleven of seventeen Inspector-Generalships (65 percent),
• twenty-five of seventy-one Director-General level posts (35 percent).
In addition, the Head and Deputy Head of Bakin (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, State Intelligence Coordinating B ody), responsible for internal security estimates, are military (General Yoga Sugama and Lieutenant-General L. Benny Murdani, respectively). Bakin does not usually appear in official lists of government officeslit but maintains an extensive network and reports directly to the President.15
Trends
How does this level of penetration compare with earlier periods in the New Or der? Some reliable reference points are tallies made by Crouch for 1966,16Emmerson Conceivably, a very few military figures may not have been identified as such, and even fewer civilians may have been categorized as military. Any such errors should not materially change any of the conclusions drawn here, but the author would appreciate knowing of any suspected misclassifications.
13. Sometimes this group is collectively referred to loosely as "the palace," so named because of their ready access to President Suharto, whose ceremonial head quarters is Istana Merdeka (Independence Palace).
14. These two top Bakin officials are not counted in the higher central bureaucracy, as defined here. • Earlier counterparts of today's Coordinating Ministers were less likely to be military (1 of 5 in 1966, 0 of 3 in 1971, 2 of 3 in 1981).
• Ministers of State, with their specialized responsibilities, continued to be wholly civilian (1971 and now).
• • Inspector-Generalships declined slightly from 73 percent military in 1971 (when only 11 Departments had them) to 65 percent now (when all do). Over this same time period, however, the absolute number of military Inspectors-General increased from 8 to 11.
• Director-Generalships seem to have been held at constant levels of military incumbency over the course of the New Order (36 percent in 1966, 36 per cent in 1971, 35 percent in 1981) .
At the highest levels, military penetration has remained near complete (the President and his principal immediate aides) or increased (Coordinating Ministers). There is as yet no practical evidence of any effort to "re-civilianize" even grad ually military karyawan slots in the higher central bureaucracy. Such a reversal of the historic trend would seriously upset the many dependent clients of serving mili tary karyawan. However, occasional statements by military spokesmen refer to ABRI's need only to guard "the strategic points" in the administration of the country.
Structuring Military Domination
For regime maintenance it is more critical that the military control certain De partments than others. One indicator of how President Suharto and his closest colleagues assess this matter is the proportion of top slots, from Coordinating Min ister down to Directors-General, filled by military officers. Using this gauge, the most crucial Departments are now Hankam (100 percent of its leading positions occupied by the military) and Home Affairs (89 percent).
Effective total military control of Hankam has its motivational origins in the united ABRI determination that never again should civilians be placed in positions whereby they could create disunity within or among the several armed services. Indeed, examination of Hankam rosters for 1966, 1971, and 1981 shows that ABRI has never held less than 90 percent of that Department's top slots.22 Moreover, these figures conceal unprecedented major organizational consolidation of the mili tary staff and command structure over the course of the New Order.
This prolonged process of concentrating power at the center began simply with the reshuffling, dismissal, detention, or killing of military officers considered un reliable in the purges and battles following the murders of six Army generals on the night of September 30, 1965 (officially labeled the 30 September Movement, Gerakan September Tigapuluh, with the deliberately sinister acronym Gestapu). Centralization advanced more sharply between November 1969 and April 1970 when service heads were downgraded from Ministerial rank to Chiefs-of-Staff (Chief for the Police) and lost operational control over their respective forces. Their staffs were shifted to Hankam. A revised system o f Regional Defense Commands (Komando Wilayah Pertahanan, Kowilhan) integrating services in the field together with re moval of "native sons" from top command roles outside Java effectively ended any recurrent threat of "warlordism." All these changes also worked to institutionalize Army dominance over the other services.23
Another centralization exercise during 1974 and 1975 followed the anti-Japanese, anti-government riots of January 1974 with their related intra-Army intrigues (offi cially, the 15 January Calamity, Malapetaka 15 Januari, Malari). This shifted major staff and specialized agencies from Kopkamtib, seen as having abused power in anti-regime power plays, to clear Ministerial control under a rationalized system of 22. Based on the same sources as in the "Trends" section, except that, since Crouch provides no breakdowns by Department, tallies had to be made from a raw list of July 1966 positions (the Ampera Cabinet) found in Editors, "Continuity and Particularly after General Yusuf' s appointment as Minister in 1978, still more power flowed to the center as a consequence of the need to deal with unanticipated protracted resistance in East Timor, increased outlays for arms and equipment modernization, long-delayed improvements in conditions of service for non-commis sioned officers ( b in ta ra ) and enlisted men (tamtama) , adherence to plans for retir ing senior officers at age 55, and carefully calculated promotions for some younger ones. Thus, besides a rise in military occupancy of certain categories of office in the higher central bureaucracy, there has occurred an accompanying military penetra tion of many particular programmatic sectors of government. The quantum leaps apparently occurred after the intra-regime power struggle peaking visibly in the January 1974 riots (Malari). In retrospect, Malari marks the watershed of the Suharto 1945 Generation faction's internal consolidation and consequent broad sei zure of the higher central bureaucracy.
There is no Department--even those overseen by the one civilian Coordinating Minister--in which the military is not suitably placed to control and remain apprised of its full range of activities. In nine of seventeen Departments, the SecretaryGeneral and Inspector-General positions are both held by military officers. In the other eight Departments, one or the other of these posts is held by a military man. (See the table on the next page.) In addition, Department Ministers periodically report to the President, much more typically one by one rather than in a limited or full Cabinet setting. Many of these meetings result in a press conference in which the Minister merely announces the Presidential imprimatur on a heretofore unre vealed Departmental decision or passes on a Presidential instruction he has received.
Generally, the higher central bureaucracy has become rationalized, energized, and more coercive in pursuing the goals of the New Order. 29 In their own posi tions, civilian technocrats and career bureaucrats are at least as active public pro ponents of government policies as the military karyawan. Almost all of these civil ians hold their positions because they, just as the military karyawan, have in the past earned the trust of President Suharto or some other high-level military patron. If the current University of Indonesia Faculty of Economics team of leading techno crats has groomed successors, they are not yet numerous at these highest levels of the central bureaucracy. Moreover, none of these civilian bureaucrats belongs to an opposition party. All formally give sole loyalty (m onoloyalitas) to the govern ment-backed party-surrogate Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups). No Department is any longer a fief of a particular party, such as Religion once was for the Nahdatul Ulama30 and Information for the Partai Nasional Indonesia.31
Michigan dissertation by John James MacDougall (a namesake not otherwise related to the present article's author, John A. MacDougall). 
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Communications 56 • involvement in planning or executing a major military campaign (Subroto);
• supervision of local manufacture of arms and military equipment (Habibie);
• service on the Hankam staff (A ffandi);
• previous leadership in military-related or supported organizations (Martono, Batubara).
Military Karyawan Role Enhancement
Karyawan positions, even in the higher central bureaucracy, have not tradi tionally been regarded as choice assignments by Indonesian military officers. Com mand duty, tied to now venerated or romanticized memories of the Revolution against Dutch colonialism, suppression of nation-destroying regional rebellions, and assaults crushing repeated communist treachery, was seen as embodying most closely ABRI's heroic mission. The apparent loss of the "idealism of struggle" is now often bruited about in press interviews with senior officers. Indeed, the only remaining "battle field" today is East Timor and the last previous one (under Sukarno) was Malaysia, episodes which the intensely nationalistic ABRI leadership, as well as junior officers, find easier to equate with recent national disarray than past national glory.
Earlier disparagement of the karyawan role has also decreased as the perceived importance of controlling the government bureaucracy and its actual penetration by the military has increased. Wide public visibility through the mass media and the impeccable military credentials of many incumbents have also worked to enhance the prestige accorded the karyawan role by both younger and older military officers. Assignment and promotion committees within the Hankam increasingly understand that certain officers are particularly suited by administrative and technical talents or temperament for karya rather than military staff and command positions. A minority of officers may even aspire to certain karyawan positions regarded as "wet," offering opportunities for personal or institutional graft. General Yusuf has warned senior officers publicly that ABRI should not be used as a steppingstone to prestigious karya slots.
The most prestigious service within ABRI is the Army, and it is the Army which holds four-fifths (81 percent) of military karyawan posts in the higher central bu reaucracy. Moreover, these Army karyawan are almost all high (flag-grade) com 31. The Indonesian National Party, now "fused" with two other "nationalist" and two "non-Muslim religious" parties in the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indone sian Democracy P arty). missioned officers (perwira) . Twelve percent are four-star Generals, 22 percent Lieutenant-Generals, 52 percent Major-Generals, and 10 percent Brigadiers. The remainder (two officers) are Colonels. In the other services, the distribution is even more skewed toward the higher ranks. Eighty-three percent of Navy karyawan are Admirals or Vice-Admirals, 72 percent of Air Force karyawan Marshals or Vice-Marshals, and the sole Police representative a General.
Further, the average rank of military karyawan has clearly escalated from available 1966 and 1971 benchmarks. At the beginning of the New Order, a plural ity (44 percent) of Army karyawan were only Colonels or Lieu tenant-Colonels, whereas now the single most frequent rank is Major-General (52 percent). Younger officers can readily follow in the press periodic promotions in military rank among serving karyawan. These various shifts clearly have enhanced the clout of military karyawan in their respective Departments.
Generational Power Monopoly
The Given President Suharto's expressed desire to spend the rest of his life serv ing the people because there is nothing he wants to do more37 and the continuing readiness of his military age cohort to perform karya duty, any voluntary change of generation (atih generasi) within the phalanx of military karyawan is remote over the next five years. If such a generational succession among these karyawan has even been planned, it is not a subject of general public discussion as is the succession for active duty military in the staff and command stru ctu re.38
At most, carefully selected officers from the misnamed bridge generation ( gene rasi jembatan or schakel generatie) 39 37. A n ta ra , November 5, 1981 . FBIS D aily R eport Asia & P acific, Vol. 4, No. 217, November 10, 1981 . The November 6, 1981 , Kompas reports Suharto's actual words as the lead sentence of its lead story on page one: "Bagi saya tak ada lain, saya hanya in gin menggunakan sisa-sisa hidup saya untuk mengabdi bagi kepentingan rakyat." The statement, made to the third Congress o f the government-backed KNPI (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, Indonesian National Youth Committee), seems Suharto's indirect Javanese way of saying he intends to remain President until he dies. Interestingly, A ntara1 s English service quotes Suharto as having said he wished to serve "the nation and the state," not "the people" (ra k y a t), his actual choice of word.
38. For example, see the highly illuminating article by Bondan Winarno, "Alih Generasi: Alamiah atau Terencana?" in M utiara, No. 252, September 30-October 13, 1981. 39. Misnamed because the concept is too often tied to officers' military education institution(s) rather than to age. As a consequence, many officers who self-iden tify as Generation of 1945 find themselves annoyingly categorized as "transitional" or "bridge," a less prestigious location.
40. Includes here Sabara (education interrupted), Yogi Supardi, and Atwar Nurhadi on the active list; and Urip Widodo, Sukoco, Pang Suparto, and Aswasmarmo, retired.
41. Includes here Worang, Panggabean, Surono, Ahmad Tahir, and Tirtosudiro, all retired. officers into these karya jobs, it is difficult to understand why that process has not even begun. Suharto has instead facilitated moving retired officers of any age into these positions by an October 1981 regulation forming a military reserve.
The Successor Generation C risis By maintaining dominance over the state apparatus via its military karyawan staffing patterns, the Generation of 1945 leadership loyal to President Suharto seeks to assure itself the political stability required for a smooth generational transfer of leadership positions elsewhere within the Army by sometime in 1983. What is entailed there is not simply a seeding of the Army staff and command struc ture with token representatives of the Young Generation but rather a wholesale intra-Army intergenerational power transfer.
The Generation of 1945 senior officers (from all current factions) made what amounts to a solemn contract to this effect in the Third Army Seminar in 1972.lf2
The consensual results of those cross-generational meetings were subsequently published and used as instructional materials in the various military educational institutions. Defense Minister General Yusuf has on many public occasions given assurances this power transfer will occur and should not be resisted, and other senior Army spokesmen have cautioned civilians neither to worry about nor meddle in the process.
The overall design thus eventually would entail two major power centers: the retired military karyawan of the 1945 Generation in the higher central bureaucracy and the active duty Army staff and command structure of the Young Generation. For some indeterminate period of time the cleavage between the retired Army offi cers in control of politics and the active duty Army officers in control of the guns would therefore be sharply drawn. The formula for regime maintenance would essentially be shifted from depoliticization to repoliticization.
It is not inconceivable that such an arrangement could remain stable, but its longevity would be inherently limited by the aging and dying off of the 1945 Genera tion. Before then, it strains credulity to think the 1945 Generation will voluntarily It is possible, but on the basis of present evidence unlikely, that the Suharto 1945 Generation faction actually now posits a pressing, near-future need to reduce significantly this cleavage. Should such a felt need develop, it may come too late for Suharto himself, and perhaps his faction generally, to reap the full benefits for regime perpetuation of moving toward construction of a network of interpersonal links across generational lines. At present, General Yusuf, by virtue of his pre siding (more intimately than Suharto) over assignments and promotions and his well-publicized prodigious travel to field commands, would appear to be the princi pal beneficiary of such interpersonal bonds as have been forged. It is implausible that approximately six thousand younger Army officers actually have, or personally see, their fates, orchestrated primarily by Suharto himself.
ABRI doctrine does not sanction generational stratification in the carrying out of its dual function. At minimum, the Young Generation could charge a deviation from a still valid core ABRI doctrine. But another more likely outcome would seem an increasingly active private and even public probing of the operational meaning of ABRI's dual function in a changing Indonesia. It is likely this will mark the emergence at the national level of the Young Generation's more politically skilled officers. This process may be spurred by General Yusuf's March 1982 declaration that publication of a sounder ( lebih u tuh ) formulation of ABRI's civil mission ( kekaryaan) was imminent.
Already several retired 1945 Generation ABRI factions have attacked the ruling 1945 Generation faction for expanding the civil side of the dual function far beyond what was originally envisaged. Past writing by widely respected current ABRI 1945 Generation "outs" has comprised major textual material in the professional mili tary education of the ABRI Young Generation. **3 Among others, retired General 43. The impact of the four-year academy course at Magelang for Army cadets ( taruna) is great. Cadets are effectively isolated from the surrounding civilian society and subjected to rigorous indoctrination and training. Discipline is harsh.
Angkatan Bersenjata and other official ABRI publications are staple reading fare.
Cadets have better classrooms, accommodations, and food than in most non-military educational institutions in Indonesia. When allowed to leave the campus for Mage lang, an old garrison town of the Dutch colonial army, they are discouraged from eating at roadside stalls (in favor of the better restaurants) or using pedicabs (in favor of motorized transport). They graduate with an expectation they will become a ruling class and exhibit considerable self-confidence and esprit de corps. Besides being very disproportionately Javanese, about 40 percent of new Akabri cadets come from ABRI families. For more details, see various issues of A k a b ri and Peter Britton, "Indonesia's Neo-Colonial Armed Forces," B ulletin o f Concerned Asian Scholars, 7, 3 (July-September 1975) , pp. 14-21. Nasution, considered influential among these post-Revolutionary officers, has widely published stinging critiques of the later New Order regime. Î ndonesia's succession politics are not occurring in a regional vacuum. While politically aware officers remain Indonesia-centric in outlook, more attention is paid other ASEAN (Association o f Southeast Asian Nations) members than in past years. Many of Singapore's and Malaysia's younger Ministerial-level leadership have visited with their Indonesian counterparts, some many times. Dr. Mahathir's ascension to the Malaysian Prime Ministership was especially widely commented on in the Indone sian press as a smooth and successful generational transfer of power which Indone sia might admire or even emulate. His subsequent anti-corruption campaign has been similarly acknowledged.
But Indonesia has no dominant ruling mass-based political party comparable to Malaysia's UMNO (United Malay National Organization) or Singapore's PAP (People's Action Party) through which those countries' generational successions have so far been so well managed. Nor on closer examination would the "free-fight liberalism" within UMNO or the PAP's "guided democracy" meet ideological canons of accepta bility among almost any of Indonesia's dominant and alternative elites. Still, the plain facts of ongoing successful generational transitions in these two neighboring states will aggravate the naggingly insistent perception that Indonesia's own change of generations is a necessary end without a sufficient means. The odds for anomic change therefore increase. 
APPENDIX B HIGHER STATE INSTITUTIONS AND NON-DEPARTMENTAL GOVERNMENT BOARDS
The abbreviations and conventions used here parallel those in Appendix A. Positions and incumbents in this list are believed current as of mid-December 1981. Persons with an asterisk after their names, however, are the last known incumbents in their positions and may or may not currently hold them. 
Higher State Institutions

APPENDIX C SELECTED BIOGRAPHIC SOURCE MATERIALS
The variety of sources from which biographic information on the Indonesian military may be drawn is quite large. What appears below reflects only one of these types of sources: compilations of biographies using a uniform format. Most of these resources also include numerous biographies of civilians. Name lists of several types proved quite valuable as well but are not included here. The author would appreciate knowing of additional major compilations.
Major Biographic Compilations
A. Official Hankam Directories APPENDIX D SELECTED MONOGRAPH LENGTH STUDIES ON THE INDONESIAN MILITARY
Below is a reading list of monograph length studies focusing explicitly on the Indonesian military or containing much significant material on it not easily available elsewhere. Relevant article-length materials and general works on Indonesian poli tics have been excluded in the interest of drawing attention to a limited number of studies containing large amounts of information. The list is not exhaustive. West ern sources in English prevail, but some Indonesian primary sources and a variety of viewpoints are represented.
